Behind the “Red Sea return wave” in the summer of 2026 is another difficult decision for the global shipping industry as it seeks to strike a balance between order and efficiency amid a turbulent market environment.

Since July 2026, liner giants including Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, CMA CGM and Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) have successively resumed several routes or voyages via the Suez Canal–Red Sea corridor, beginning to accelerate their return to the Red Sea in a planned manner.

On July 6, Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd jointly announced that the AE15 Asia-Europe service operated under their Gemini Cooperation would undergo a structural adjustment, shifting from the Cape of Good Hope diversion back to the Red Sea route. At the time, Maersk cautiously stated that the decision was made after a comprehensive assessment of the security situation in the Red Sea region, marking an important step toward its gradual return to the Red Sea route. In the following month, Maersk successively resumed Red Sea transits on several services, including MECL, WAF6 and AE19, at a pace that surprised the market.

In August, some MSC vessels also began to resume Red Sea navigation. According to statistics from analysis firm Linerlytica, in the first two weeks of August alone, at least seven eastbound voyages on MSC’s Asia-Europe/Mediterranean services chose to transit via the Suez Canal–Red Sea route. Linerlytica expects that more MSC voyages will return to the Red Sea in the future.

Corporate Confidence

Safety has always been the fundamental bottom line determining whether liner companies return to the Red Sea. In 2026, the Red Sea security situation has shown a contradictory pattern of “overall easing but localized escalation”. Even so, leading liner companies have demonstrated strong confidence in resuming sailings.

Maersk CEO Vincent Clerc made a clear statement during the company’s second-quarter earnings call: “I believe the conditions for a full return to the Red Sea in 2026 have been met.”

He emphasized that Maersk’s decision to gradually resume Red Sea services was based on continuous security assessments and information provided by relevant agencies. At the same time, he acknowledged that the situation in Yemen remains changeable, but said Maersk now has sufficient security assurance to support a larger-scale return to the Red Sea.

According to Clerc, the volume of Maersk cargo that has returned to the Red Sea route has reached one-third of normal levels, marking the completion of the “first phase” of its return plan. Next, Maersk will coordinate with its Gemini Cooperation partner Hapag-Lloyd to assess the possibility of restoring more services through the Red Sea.

However, corporate confidence does not mean risks have disappeared. Since the beginning of 2026, although Yemen’s Houthi forces have reduced large-scale systematic attacks on international merchant vessels, they have not truly abandoned armed intervention in the Red Sea shipping lane. In July 2026, the Houthis announced a maritime shipping ban against Saudi Arabia and subsequently launched multiple attacks on Saudi-linked vessels.

The insurance market has also sent the most direct warning signal. War risk premiums on routes in the southern Red Sea are currently rising rapidly. After the Houthi attack on a Saudi tanker in late July, war risk quotes for some high-risk voyages rose to around 3% of vessel value, compared with only about 0.3% previously. For a large tanker with an insured value of US$100 million, a 3% war risk surcharge would amount to US$3 million.

Therefore, while Maersk has released optimistic signals, it has also repeatedly stressed that it will continue to closely monitor the security situation in the Middle East, with the safety of crew, vessels and cargo remaining its top priority. Clerc said: “Maersk assesses operational decisions on a daily basis. If we believe there is risk, we will choose to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope again.”

The Economic Calculation

If safety is the “necessary condition” for resuming Red Sea sailings, then economics is the “sufficient condition”. In 2026, the economic motivation driving liner companies back to the Red Sea is stronger than ever.

The continued rise in diversion costs is the most direct driver. Restoring the Suez Canal–Red Sea route can save a vessel 7 to 15 days of sailing time. Taking Maersk’s MECL service as an example, after returning to the Red Sea, the westbound voyage is shortened by an average of seven days, while the eastbound voyage is shortened by an average of 14 days. For a large container ship, the operating cost saved by a single vessel is enough to cover the additional war risk insurance premium.

At the same time, continued congestion at Asian and European ports has recently worsened shortages of container vessel capacity and containers, further forcing the pace of the Red Sea return.

According to a Linerlytica report, affected by extreme weather such as Typhoon Bailu, more than 2.4 million TEUs of container capacity in North Asia, especially in the Chinese market, is facing serious delays and congestion. Major Chinese ports such as Shanghai and Ningbo saw vessel waiting times significantly extended after ships suspended operations to avoid typhoons and terminals halted business for several days. The backlog of vessels is expected to take several weeks to gradually clear.

In Europe, from July to August, multiple ports including Rotterdam in the Netherlands, Antwerp in Belgium, as well as Hamburg, Bremerhaven and Wilhelmshaven in Germany, were affected by strikes caused by labor disputes, with terminal operating efficiency impacted to varying degrees.

Some analysts believe that, against the current backdrop of severe capacity shortages, the capacity benefits released by returning to the Red Sea have already exceeded the risk cost posed by Houthi threats.

Freight rate trends are also sending a clear signal. Although the market is in the traditional peak shipping season, spot freight rates on Asia-Europe routes have fallen instead of rising.

According to the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index (SCFI) released by the Shanghai Shipping Exchange Research Institute, from early July to mid-August, the market freight rate from Shanghai Port to base ports in Europe, including ocean freight and surcharges, fell from US$3,332/TEU to US$2,945/TEU, a decline of 11.6%. During the same period, the rate from Shanghai Port to base ports in the Mediterranean, including ocean freight and surcharges, fell from US$4,561/TEU to US$3,929/TEU, a decline of 13.9%.

Taken together, the “Red Sea return wave” in the summer of 2026 is no longer merely a strategic test, but a pragmatic choice aligned with current market conditions. The time cost of diversion, the capacity loss caused by port congestion and the market pressure from falling freight rates are intertwined, making the economic calculation behind the return increasingly clear.

The collective actions of leading liner companies show that once safety risks are incorporated into a controllable cost framework, economic efficiency becomes the most important weight on the decision-making scale.

A Difficult Balance

The fragility of the Red Sea situation remains a “sword of Damocles” hanging over liner companies. Behind every decision to resume sailings is a systematic scan of multiple variables, including political signals, military developments, the insurance market and customer confidence. This precise calculation has gone far beyond a simple binary trade-off between “safety and economics”. The current return to the Red Sea is gradually evolving into a complex chess game involving the restructuring of global supply chain networks.

The Cape of Good Hope diversion has brought not only time losses, but also a global capacity “intestinal obstruction”.

Based on an average annual deployment of around 150 large vessels on the Asia-Europe route, long-term diversion is equivalent to removing the capacity of 10 to 15 ultra-large vessels from the global market. In a year of tight capacity, that figure is enough to move freight rates. When the gate to the Red Sea reopens, each resumed loop is equivalent to adding the effective capacity of three to four vessels back into the market.

According to Linerlytica estimates, if major liner companies fully resume Red Sea routes, global effective capacity supply would increase by 5% to 8%. For a global supply chain currently strained by port congestion, this would be nothing short of a “shot in the arm”.

Another logic behind liner companies accelerating their return lies in subtle changes in geopolitical dynamics. Since 2026, the targets of Houthi attacks have shifted somewhat, from indiscriminate attacks on international merchant ships to a greater focus on Saudi-linked vessels. Liner companies have chosen to accelerate their return during this window precisely because they judge that geopolitical risks have marginally improved.

However, returning to the Red Sea is not as simple as pressing a “restart” button.

On the one hand, after more than two years of Cape of Good Hope diversion operations, liner companies have already built a set of “Cape route” schedules, stowage plans and crew rotation systems. A sudden switch back to the “Red Sea model” means reconstructing the network. The complexity of this transition should not be underestimated. Schedule restructuring involves adjustments to port rotations, resetting landside logistics connections, changing bunkering nodes and other systematic tasks, requiring synchronized coordination across dozens of services, hundreds of vessels and thousands of port calls.

On the other hand, a sudden release of capacity will also impact the freight rate system, which is currently in a delicate balance. Therefore, most liner companies are expected to adopt a gradual strategy by route, vessel type and phase, in order to control the pace of capacity release and avoid a cliff-like impact on freight rates. This means the capacity dividend brought by the Red Sea return will be released gradually rather than flooding the market instantly.

Another point worth noting is that some vessels adopt a “dark transit” strategy when passing through the Red Sea, switching off their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders to hide their sailing tracks and reduce the risk of attack. This is both a tactical measure to avoid strikes and a reflection of the difficult balance liner companies must strike between safety and transparency.

But this strategy is not without cost. Switching off AIS means vessels partially “disappear” from the view of port authorities and customers. This not only affects port operation scheduling, but also weakens customers’ visibility over the real-time location of their cargo, becoming another choice liner companies must make between service transparency and safety risk.

The Red Sea return is a major drama driven by multiple forces. The gradual strategy behind schedule restructuring, the risk hedging behind “dark transit”, cautious judgments over geopolitical dynamics and strategic positioning within the competitive landscape are all testing the comprehensive management capabilities of liner companies.

More importantly, the Houthis have not given up the possibility of armed intervention in the Red Sea. The diplomatic process between Saudi Arabia and Iran remains full of uncertainty, and the surge in war risk premiums also reminds everyone that safety is not a once-and-for-all conclusion, but a dynamic assessment that must be updated daily.

But at the very least, the balance is tilting toward a return.

This summer of 2026, the collective actions of leading liner companies show that when safety risks are brought into a controllable cost framework, when economic efficiency is quantified into calculable time and money, and when operational resilience is forged into a switchable dual-track model, the Red Sea return shifts from a strategic question of “whether it is feasible” to a tactical question of “how to execute it”.

The Red Sea return may indeed be getting serious. Behind it is another difficult choice for the global shipping industry as it seeks to find a balance between order and efficiency amid a turbulent market environment.